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Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
Professor Emeritus of Law
George Washington University Law School
2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
Email: awilmarth@law.gwu.edu
August 11, 2020
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
400 - 7th Street, S.W., Suite 3E - 218
Washington, DC 20219
Re:

Docket ID OCC-2020-0026: Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking – “National Banks
and Federal Savings Associations as
Lenders,” 85 Fed. Reg. 44223 (July 22,
2020) (RIN 1557-AE97)

Thank you for giving the public an opportunity to submit comments on the referenced
proposed rule issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”). The proposed
rule would “determine when a national bank or Federal savings association . . . makes a loan and
is the ‘true lender’ in the context of a partnership between a bank and a third party, such as a
marketplace lender.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 44223. The proposed rule – to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
7.1031 – would provide that a national bank or federal savings association is deemed to “make”
a loan if the institution, “as of the date of origination: (a) Is named as the lender in the loan
agreement; or (b) Funds the loan.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 44228.
The proposed rule is designed to “operate together” with the OCC’s recently-adopted
“Madden-fix rule.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 44227.1 Under the Madden-fix rule, a loan that is “made” by
a national bank or federal savings association will retain its preemptive immunity from state
usury laws under 12 U.S.C. 85 or 1463(g) if the loan is “subsequently sold, assigned, or
otherwise transferred” to a nonbank.2
The proposed rule – operating in tandem with the Madden-fix rule – would allow a
national bank or federal savings association to form “partnerships” with nonbank lenders,
including payday lenders and auto title lenders. The two rules would allow a national bank or
federal savings association to be treated as the “lender” under 12 U.S.C. 85 or 1463(g) for loans
that are originated in its name or that it funds, even if it sells those loans to a nonbank “partner”
one day after the loans are originated.3

See OCC, “Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned or Otherwise Transferred,” 85 Fed. Reg. 33530
(June 2, 2020) [hereinafter “Madden-fix rule”].
2
Id. at 33530-33, 33536 (purpose and text of Madden-fix rule as codified in 12 C.F.R. 7.4001(e) & 160.110(d)).
3
See Notice of proposed rulemaking, 85 Fed. Reg. at 44225 (stating that “the determination of which entity made
the loan under the above standards would be complete as of the date the loan is originated and would not change,
even if the bank were to subsequently transfer the loan”) (emphasis added).
1

The two rules would permit a nonbank lender that generates loans through a
“partnership” with a national bank or federal savings association to claim preemptive immunity
from state usury laws under 12 U.S.C. 85 or 1463(g), even if the federally-chartered bank or
thrift does not retain any meaningful credit risk or other economic risk related to those loans.4
For example, the proposed rule would allow a national bank to be indemnified by its nonbank
“partner” for all losses and risks arising out of loans that the bank sells to the nonbank. Thus, a
national bank could act as a mere conduit by quickly transferring loans to its nonbank “partner,”
and the nonbank could assume all of the credit and other economic risks and control the lending
terms and enforcement for those loans. Such “partnerships” would amount to “rent-a-charter”
schemes, which the OCC has barred national banks from entering since the early 2000s (see Part
3 below).
As discussed below in Part 2, the proposed rule would preempt state “true lender” laws,
which many courts have applied in determining whether a loan is “made” by a national bank and
therefore is entitled to preemptive immunity from state usury laws under 12 U.S.C. 85. The
proposed rule’s attempt to override state “true lender” laws is unprecedented. The notice of
proposed rulemaking acknowledges that the OCC “has not previously taken regulatory action” to
define when a loan is deemed to be “made” by a national bank. 85 Fed. Reg. at 44224.
According to the proposed rule, a loan that is “made” by a national bank under one of its
two tests would also be subject to “the panoply of applicable Federal laws and regulations
(including but not limited to consumer protection laws) governing lending by banks.” 85 Fed.
Reg. at 44225. The proposed rule evidently seeks to preempt a wide range of state laws –
including state licensing, examination, and consumer protection laws – that would otherwise
apply to nonbank lenders that establish “partnerships” with national banks. For example, a loan
that is “made” by a national bank under either of the proposed rule’s highly formalistic tests
would evidently be covered by the OCC’s sweeping claims of preemption of state law under 12
C.F.R. 7.4008 (for loans “made” by national banks that are not secured by real estate) or 12
C.F.R. 34.4 (for real estate loans “made” by national banks), even if the loan is subsequently sold
to a nonbank “partner.” Accordingly, the proposed rule’s scope of preemption is not limited to
state usury laws and potentially embraces a far broader range of state laws.
For the following reasons, the proposed rule is unlawful, invalid, and contrary to the
public interest:
(1) The proposed rule does not comply with the substantive and procedural requirements
set forth in 12 U.S.C. 25b, which governs the OCC’s authority to issue rules and orders that seek
to preempt state consumer financial laws.
(2) The proposed rule would unlawfully override state “true lender” laws without
congressional authorization and in contravention of applicable court decisions.

Unless the context indicates otherwise, references to “national banks” in this comment letter apply equally to
federal savings associations. The same preemption standards apply to both categories of institutions. See 12 U.S.C.
1465; S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 176 (2010).
4
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(3) The proposed rule is contrary to the public interest because it would allow national
banks to establish “rent-a-charter” schemes with nonbank lenders, thereby encouraging predatory
lending and other abusive practices that would inflict very serious injuries on consumers and
small businesses.
(4) The proposed rule would reverse the OCC’s existing policy that has barred national
banks from participating in “rent-a-charter” schemes with nonbank lenders since the early 2000s.
The proposed rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act because the OCC has not provided
the required public notice of its intention to reverse that policy as well as the factual, legal, and
policy reasons for doing so. It would therefore be unlawful for the OCC to adopt the proposed
rule unless the agency first provides to the public: (A) notice of the OCC’s intention to reverse
its policy banning “rent-a-charter” schemes as well as a reasoned explanation of the agency’s
factual, legal, and policy basis for doing so, and (B) a reasonable opportunity to submit
comments on the OCC’s proposal to reverse its policy and its stated reasons for doing so.
The following analysis explains in greater detail why the OCC’s proposed rule would be
unlawful and contrary to the public interest if it were adopted. The OCC should withdraw the
proposed rule, and the OCC should not issue any other rule or order that would (1) override state
“true lender” laws, or (2) allow national banks to establish “rent-a-charter” schemes with
nonbank lenders.
1.

The Proposed Rule Does Not Comply with 12 U.S.C. 25b

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank”), established a new statutory framework for determining
the applicability of state consumer financial laws to national banks and federal savings
associations. Under 12 U.S.C. 25b(b)(1) , a state consumer financial law is preempted “only if”
(A) the state law has “a discriminatory effect on national banks” or (B) the state law “prevents or
significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers,” or (C) the state law
is preempted by a federal statute other than the National Bank Act (“NBA”). Section
25b(b)(1)(B) expressly incorporates the “prevent or significantly interfere” standard for
preemption set forth in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
See Lusnak v. Bank of America, N.A., 883 F.3d 1185, 1188, 1191-94 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 567 (2018); Hymes v. Bank of America, N.A., 408 F. Supp. 3d 171, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2019);
Senate Report No. 111-176, at 175-76 (2010). Under 12 U.S.C. 1465, questions concerning the
applicability of state laws to federal savings associations are governed by “the laws and legal
standards applicable to national banks regarding the preemption of State law,” including 12
U.S.C. 25b. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the same preemption standards for both
national banks and federal thrifts.5
Section 25b(b)(4) and Section 1465(b) declare that the NBA and the Home Owners’
Loan Act (“HOLA”) do not “occupy the field in any area of state law.” Accordingly, field
Jared Elosta, “Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How the Dodd-Frank Act Changes the
Preemption Debate,” 89 North Carolina Law Review 1273, 1298 (2011); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Dodd-Frank
Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services,” 36 Journal of Corporation Law
893, 925-28 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1891970.
5
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preemption does not exist under either the NBA or HOLA. Instead, a state law is preempted
only if it creates an irreconcilable conflict with federal law, based on the “prevent or significantly
interfere” preemption standard formulated in Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31, 33. See Elosta, supra
note 5, at 1276-77, 1298; Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 927-28, 932.
As explained above, the OCC’s proposed rule would (i) preempt state usury laws from
applying to nonbank lenders with respect to loans that are deemed to be “made” by national
banks under either of the proposed rule’s two highly formalistic tests, (ii) override state “true
lender” laws, and (iii) potentially preempt a broad range of other state laws, including consumer
protection laws, from applying to nonbank lenders that establish “partnerships” with national
banks. Under 12 U.S.C. 25b(b)(1)(B), the OCC does not have authority to adopt the proposed
rule unless it demonstrates that application of the foregoing state laws to such nonbank lenders
“prevents or significantly interferes with” the exercise of authorized powers by national banks.
Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1191-94; Hymes, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 184, 193-98; Elosta, supra note 5, at
1298; Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 927-30. The OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking does not
refer to Section 25b’s “prevents or significantly interferes with” preemption standard, and the
notice does not attempt to satisfy that standard.
Under 12 U.S.C. 25b(c), the OCC must show that “substantial evidence, made on the
record of the proceeding, supports the specific finding regarding the preemption of [state
consumer financial law] in accordance with the legal standard” set forth in Barnett Bank –
namely, that the state law in question “prevents or significantly interferes with” the exercise of
lawful powers by national banks. See Lusnak, 883 F3d at 1194; Elosta, supra note 5, at 1301;
Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 931. The notice of proposed rulemaking does not mention the
“substantial evidence” requirement and does not attempt to comply with it. The notice is devoid
of any showing of “substantial evidence” that application of state consumer financial laws to
nonbank “partners” of national banks “prevents or significantly interferes with” the exercise of
authorized powers by national banks.
The notice of proposed rulemaking asserts that state “true lender” laws create
“uncertainty about the legal framework that applies to the loans made as part of” partnerships
between nonbank lenders and national banks. 85 Fed. Reg. at 44224. However, the OCC does
not provide any empirical data that would quantify the extent of any burdens or costs created by
the alleged “uncertainty.” The OCC also does not provide any empirical data that would
quantify the claimed benefits of lending “partnerships” between nonbank lenders and national
banks. Crucially, as shown below in Part 3, the OCC has not considered the tremendous costs
and injuries that the proposed rule would inflict on consumers and small businesses.
The OCC’s proposed rule also does not mention, or attempt to comply with, the
requirement that the OCC must act on a “case-by-case basis” when it issues a preemptive rule or
order. 12 U.S.C. 25b(1)(B) & (3); see Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1192, 1194; Elosta, supra note 5, at
1300-01; Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 931. To satisfy the “case-by-case” requirement, the OCC
must consider “the impact of a particular State consumer financial law on any national bank that
is subject to that law, or the law of any other State with substantially equivalent terms.” 12
U.S.C. 25b(b)(3)(A). Thus, the OCC must identify each state law that it believes would be
preempted under the Barnett Bank standard codified in Section 25b(b)(1)(B). In addition, the
4

OCC must “first consult with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and take the views of
the Bureau into account” when the OCC makes its “case-by-case” determination. 12 U.S.C.
25b(b)(3)(B). The OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking does not indicate that the OCC has
consulted with the Bureau, and the notice does not contain any identification and analysis of
particular state laws, as required by Section 25b’s “case-by-case” mandate.
In sum, the OCC’s proposed rule does not satisfy the substantive and procedural
requirements of 12 U.S.C. 25b. As shown above, the OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking does
not even mention those requirements.
Section 25b(f) provides that the substantive and procedural requirements of Section 25b
do not affect “the authority conferred by [12 U.S.C. 85] for the charging of interest by a national
bank” (emphasis added). Section 25b(f) does not exempt the OCC’s proposed rule from the
substantive and procedural requirements of Section 25b. The scope of the proposed rule goes far
beyond the subject of the “charging of interest by a national bank.” The proposed rule seeks to
preempt state usury laws from applying to the interest charged by nonbanks that form
“partnerships” with national banks and purchase loans from those banks. In addition, as shown
in Part 2(b), the proposed rule attempts to override state “true lender” laws, which determine
whether a loan is “made” by a national bank or by its nonbank “partner.” The proposed rule
would also potentially apply the sweeping preemption provisions of 12 C.F.R. 7.4008 and 34.4
to loans that are sold by national banks to nonbank “partners.” Accordingly, any attempt by the
OCC to adopt the proposed rule in final form would violate multiple provisions of Section 25b,
including the “prevents or significantly interferes with” preemption standard, the “substantial
evidence” requirement, and the “case-by-case” mandate.
The proposed rule is the latest example of a highly disturbing trend in which the OCC has
repeatedly failed to comply with legal standards that govern its authority to issue preemption
determinations. When the OCC recently adopted its preemptive “Madden-fix rule,” it did not
satisfy the substantive and procedural requirements of 12 U.S.C. 25b. The OCC asserted that its
Madden-fix rule was “not subject to the requirements of section 25b,” but that assertion was
clearly erroneous.6
In 2004, the OCC adopted sweeping regulations that preempted broad categories of state
law across the nation and amounted to “de facto field preemption.”7 The OCC’s 2004
preemption rules did not comply with the “prevent or significantly interfere” preemption
standard set forth in Barnett Bank, and the OCC’s rationale for its blanket preemption rules was
subsequently rejected by courts and overruled by Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act.
In Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009), the Supreme Court held that the
OCC’s aggressive rationale for its 2004 preemption rules “does not comport with” the NBA
See the OCC’s Madden-fix rule, supra note 1, at 33533. See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “Comment Letter in
Opposition to the OCC’s Valid-When-Made Rule” (Jan. 17, 2020), at 2-4 (explaining why the OCC’s Madden-fix
rule was required to comply with Section 25b’s substantive and procedural requirements) [hereinafter “Wilmarth
Comment Letter”], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3523939.
7
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious
Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection,” 23 Annual Review of Banking & Financial Law 225,
228-30, 233-37 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=577863; see also Elosta, supra note 5, at 1280-81.
6
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because the OCC “attempts to do what Congress declined to do: exempt national banks from all
state banking laws, or at least state enforcement of those laws.” Id. at 533. In Lusnak, the Ninth
Circuit stated, “The OCC’s [2004] preemption rule reads more broadly than Barnett Bank’s
‘prevent or significantly interfere’ standard in two respects.” 883 F.3d at 1192 n.4. The Ninth
Circuit held that the OCC’s 2004 preemption test “did not conform to Barnett Bank” and was
entitled to “little, if any, deference.” Id. at 1193.
Congress rejected the OCC’s 2004 preemption rules when it adopted the Dodd-Frank
Act. The Senate committee report on the Dodd-Frank Act explained that, under 12 U.S.C. 25b,
“[t]he standard for preempting State consumer financial law would return to what it had been for
decades, those recognized by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)
(Barnett), undoing broader standards adopted by rules, orders, and interpretations issued by the
OCC in 2004.” S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 175-76 (2010); see also Elosta, supra note 5, at 12981300; Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 936-37; Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 246-52.
Congress’s displeasure with the OCC’s aggressive preemption efforts (further described
in Part 3 below) caused Congress to include a provision in Dodd-Frank that greatly reduces the
degree of judicial deference for preemption determinations by the OCC. Under 12 U.S.C.
25b(b)(5)(A), the OCC’s preemptive rules and orders are no longer entitled to deference under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Instead,
the OCC’s preemptive rules and orders receive a much lower level of deference under Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). “Dodd-Frank’s endorsement of Skidmore deference will
force the OCC to bear the burden of persuading the courts that its preemption determinations are
correct.” Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 932-34; see also Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1192-93 (explaining
the significance of Dodd-Frank’s stipulation that “the OCC’s preemption determinations are
entitled only to Skidmore deference”); Hymes, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 179-80 (“only Skidmore
deference applies to the OCC’s preemption determinations”).
In 2011, the OCC revised its preemption rules, purportedly to bring them into conformity
with the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandates contained in 12 U.S.C. 25b and 1465. 76 Fed. Reg. 43549
(July 21, 2011). However, the OCC’s revised rules did not include the “prevent or significantly
interfere” preemption standard established by Barnett Bank, despite Congress’s express
incorporation of that standard in 12 U.S.C. 25b(b)(1)(B). The OCC’s 2011 rulemaking made the
extraordinary assertion – contrary to Congress’s explicit mandate – that “the Dodd-Frank Act
does not create a new stand-alone ‘prevents or significantly interferes’ preemption standard.” 76
Fed. Reg. at 43555. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Lusnak, “the OCC has largely reaffirmed
its previous preemption conclusions without further analysis under the Barnett Bank standard,”
in spite of Congress’s statutory incorporation of that standard. The Ninth Circuit therefore held
that the OCC’s “conclusions” in its 2011 preemption rules “are entitled to little, if any,
deference.” 883 F.3d at 1193-94; accord, Hymes, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 191.8
Three of the preemption rules that the OCC issued in 2011 – 12 C.F.R. 7.4007, 7.4008,
and 34.4 – continue to assert that broad categories of state laws are preempted across the nation.
See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “OCC Gets It Wrong on Preemption, Again,” American Banker (July 29, 2011),
at 8, available on Westlaw at 2011 WLNR 14961080 (criticizing the OCC’s 2011 rules for “refus[ing] to accept
‘prevents or significantly interferes’ as the governing preemption standard for [national] banks”).
8
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As explained above, the proposed rule would evidently apply the last two of those regulations to
loans that are sold by national banks to nonbank “partners.” When the OCC issued those
sweeping and categorical preemption rules in 2011, the OCC did not comply with Section 25b’s
“substantial evidence” and “case-by-case” requirements. See Wilmarth, supra note 8. The OCC
claimed in 2011 that it did not need to comply with Section 25b’s requirements because its
blanket preemption rules were based on similar rules adopted in 2004. The OCC asserted that its
“regulations in effect prior to the effective date [of Dodd-Frank] are not subject to the case-bycase requirement.” 76 Fed. Reg. at 43556-57, 43558.
The OCC’s claim that its 2004 rules remained valid – even though they did not comply
with Section 25b’s substantive and procedural requirements – was clearly erroneous. Under 12
U.S.C. 25b(b)(1), state consumer financial laws are preempted “only if” a federal agency or court
makes a preemption determination in full compliance with all of the requirements of Section
25b. Section 1043 of the Dodd-Frank Act (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5553) created a very limited
exception to that mandate. Section 1043 preserved the applicability of existing OCC regulations
and orders to “any contract entered into [by a national bank or its subsidiary] before July 21,
2010” (the date of Dodd-Frank’s enactment). Congress intended that Section 1043 would
“provide stability to existing contracts” – those entered into before Dodd-Frank’s enactment – by
allowing those contracts to be governed by the OCC’s pre-Dodd-Frank rules and orders. Senate
Report No. 111-176, at 175 (2010).
Section 1043’s carefully limited exception provides compelling evidence of Congress’s
intent that the OCC’s existing preemptive rules and orders would not apply to national bank
transactions occurring after July 21, 2010, “unless they are brought into full compliance with the
new preemption standards and requirements established by [12 U.S.C. 25b].” Wilmarth, supra
note 5, at 940. The OCC’s argument that its 2004 preemption rules (as reissued in 2011)
remained valid for new transactions after 2010 would render Section 1043 “meaningless, in
violation of the ‘endlessly repeated principle of statutory construction . . . that all words in a
statute are to be assigned meaning, and that nothing therein is to be construed as surplusage.’”
Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 643-44 (2000) (quoting
Qi-Zhou v. Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
The OCC’s argument also contravenes the related canon of statutory construction known
as expressio unius est exclusio alterius – i.e., the “mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another [similar] thing.” IIAA v. Hawke, 211 F.3d at 644 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); accord, American Land Title Ass’n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 155-56 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 971 (1993). Congress’s decision to provide a narrowly limited exception from
Section 25b for national bank contracts that preexisted Dodd-Frank necessarily implies that all
subsequent transactions of national banks are governed by Section 25b’s preemption standards.
Accordingly, the OCC violated 12 U.S.C. 25b when it issued three blanket preemption rules in
2011 – 12 C.F.R. 7.4007, 7.4008, and 34.4 – that did not comply with Section 25b’s “prevents or
significantly interferes” preemption standard or with Section 25b’s “case-by-case” and
“substantial evidence” requirements. Wilmarth, supra note 8.
The OCC has also failed to comply with 12 U.S.C. 25b(d), which requires the OCC to
“periodically conduct a review, though notice and public comment, of each determination that a
7

provision of Federal law preempts a State consumer financial law,” within five years after
issuing that determination. See Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1194. The OCC must issue a public notice
for each preemption review, including an invitation for public comments. After completing each
preemption review, the OCC must issue a public notice describing the results of its review and
submit a report to the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The OCC’s public notice and report to those Committees
must state whether the OCC intends to continue, rescind, or amend the preemption determination
it reviewed. The OCC has not conducted any public reviews pursuant to Section 25b(d), even
though the OCC issued its most important preemption rules nine years ago, in July 2011. The
OCC has issued several other preemption rules that are at least 15-20 years old, and it has not
conducted any public reviews of those rules pursuant to Section 25b(d). See, e.g., 12 C.F.R.
7.4002, 7.4003, 7.4004, 7.4005, 34.5, and 37.1.
The Supreme Court has admonished the OCC that it cannot “pick and choose what
portion of the law binds [it].” First National Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385
U.S. 252, 261 (1966). The OCC should withdraw the proposed rule due to its glaring lack of
compliance with 12 U.S.C. 25b. The OCC should also conduct public reviews of all of its
existing preemption rules and orders that are more than five years old – including those adopted
in July 2011 – as required by 12 U.S.C. 25b(d).
2.

The Proposed Rule Would Unlawfully Preempt State Laws That Apply to
Nonbank “Partners” of National Banks and Federal Savings Associations.
a.

12 U.S.C. 85 and 1463(g) Preempt State Usury Laws Only for
“Interest” That Is Lawfully Charged by National Banks and Federal
Savings Associations.

The OCC does not have authority to extend the scope of preemption provided by 12
U.S.C. 85 and 1463(g) to reach purchasers and assignees of loans made by national banks and
federal savings associations. Section 85 specifies the “interest” that a national bank may “take,
receive, reserve, and charge” on its loans. The “interest” allowed to a national bank under
Section 85 depends on the state in which that bank is “located.” Section 85’s explicit terms show
that the power to charge “interest” thereunder is granted only to national banks and does not
extend to purchasers or assignees of loans made by national banks. Less than a decade after
Congress enacted the NBA, the Supreme Court held that Section 85 was intended “to allow to
National associations the rate allowed by the State to natural persons generally, and a higher
rate, if State banks of issue were authorized to charge a higher rate.” Tiffany v. National Bank of
Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 413 (1873) (emphasis added). A century later, the Supreme
Court reiterated that Section 85 establishes the terms on which “a national bank may charge
interest.” Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 308 (1978)
(emphasis added). The Court pointed out in Marquette that its decision – which allowed a
national bank to “export” to other states the interest rate allowed by the state in which the bank
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was “located” – did not extend either to the bank’s non-depository subsidiary or to other parties
with which the bank had contractual relationships.9
Under 12 U.S.C. 1463(g)(1), federal savings associations may “charge . . . interest” under
terms that are “substantially identical” to the authority granted to national banks under Section
85. Garvey Properties/762 v. First Financial Savings & Loan Ass’n, 845 F.2d 519, 521 (5th Cir.
1988). Congress enacted Section 1463(g) in 1980, together with 12 U.S.C. 1831d, which
provides comparable authority to FDIC-insured, state-chartered banks and savings associations.
Sections 1463(g) and 1831d, like Section 85, do not include any reference to the right of a
federally-chartered or federally-insured depository institution to transfer its preemptive immunity
from state usury laws to nonbank purchasers and assignees of its loans.
In Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993), the court explained that Section 1831d “achieves parity between
national banks and their state-chartered counterparts” because Congress made a “conscious
choice to incorporate the [National] Bank Act standard” into Section 1831d. The preemptive
immunity granted by Sections 1463(g) and 1831d applies only to “interest” that is lawfully
charged by federally-chartered or federally-insured depository institutions, just as the parallel
preemption provided by Section 85 applies only to “interest” that is lawfully charged by national
banks. In re Community Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 296 (3d Cir. 2005) (12 U.S.C. 85 and
1831d “apply only to national banks and state chartered banks, not to non-bank purchasers of
second mortgage loans”); Goleta National Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717
(E.D.N.C. 2002) (“While it is true that the NBA does preempt state efforts to regulate the interest
collected by national banks, the NBA patently does not apply to non-national banks.”).
The preemption standards established by the Dodd-Frank Act reinforce the conclusion
that Sections 85 and 1463(g) do not provide preemptive immunity for nonbank “partners” that
purchase loans made by national banks or federal thrifts. Congress provided in three of DoddFrank’s provisions – 12 U.S.C. 25b(b)(2), (e), and (h)(2) – that state laws apply to each
subsidiary, affiliate, and agent of a national bank to the same extent as state laws apply to any
other person, corporation, or other entity, unless the subsidiary, affiliate, or agent is itself
chartered as a national bank. See S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 176 (2010) (explaining that, under
Dodd-Frank, “State law applies to State-chartered nondepository institution subsidiaries,
affiliates, and agents of national banks, other than entities that are themselves chartered as
national banks.”); see also Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 934-35. State laws similarly apply to
nonbank subsidiaries, affiliates, and agents of federal thrifts under 12 U.S.C. 1465(a).
The foregoing provisions of Section 25b overruled and negated several court decisions
issued prior to 2010 – including Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) – that
extended the NBA’s preemptive scope to reach nonbank subsidiaries and agents of national
banks. See Mississippi Dept. of Finance v. Pikco Finance, Inc., 97 So.3d 1203, 1209 n.7 (Miss.
2012); Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 934-35. In view of Section 25b’s denial of preemption to
See Marquette, 439 U.S. at 307-08 (“There is no allegation in petitioners’ complaints that either Omaha Service
Corp. or the Minnesota merchants and banks participating in the BankAmericard program are themselves extending
credit in violation of Minn.Stat. § 48.185 (1978), and we therefore have no occasion to determine the application of
the National Bank Act in such a case.”).
9
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nonbank subsidiaries, affiliates, and agents of national banks, the OCC’s proposed rule and its
Madden-fix rule violate congressional intent by attempting to extend the preemptive scope of
Sections 85 and 1463(g) to reach nonbank purchasers and assignees of loans made by national
banks and federal thrifts. Nonbank purchasers and assignees are parties to contracts with
national banks and federal thrifts, just as their subsidiaries, affiliates, and agents are. The OCC
has no authority to give nonbank purchasers and assignees of loans a preemptive immunity that
Congress has expressly denied to other types of contractual counterparties – nonbank
subsidiaries, affiliates, and agents – that have closer relationships with national banks and federal
thrifts.
As discussed above, Section 25b(f) provides additional evidence of Congress’s intent not
to extend preemption of state usury laws beyond national banks. Section 25b(f) preserves only
“the authority conferred by section 85 . . . for the charging of interest by a national bank”
(emphasis added). Federal thrifts are subject to the same limited scope of usury preemption
under 12 U.S.C. 1465(a). Accordingly, the proposed rule – like the OCC’s Madden-fix rule – is
invalid because it unlawfully provides that the preemption of state usury laws would be
“complete as of the date the loan is originated and would not change, even if the bank were to
subsequently transfer the loan.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 44225.10
b.

The OCC Has No Authority to Preempt State “True Lender” Laws,
Which Determine Whether a Loan Is “Made” by a Nonbank Lender
Instead of a National Bank or Federal Savings Association

The OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking acknowledges that federal statutes – including
12 U.S.C. 85 and 1463(g) – “do not specifically address which entity makes a loan (or, in the
vernacular commonly used in case law, which entity is the ‘true lender’) and, therefore, what
legal framework applies, when the loan is originated as part of a lending relationship between a
bank and a third party.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 44244. The OCC claims that it is “reasonable to
interpret” federal statutes “to provide that a bank makes a loan whenever it, as of the date of
origination, (1) is named as the lender in the loan agreement or (2) funds the loan.” Id. at 44246.
However, the OCC does not identify any federal statute that supports its novel “interpretation.”
The OCC admits that none of the federal statutes authorizing national banks and federal savings
associations to make contracts and loans “describes how to determine when a bank has, in fact,
exercised this authority, and when, by contrast, the bank’s relationship partner has made the
loan.” Id. at 44224, 44225 (quote).
The OCC also asserts that it should receive Chevron deference for its unprecedented
“interpretation.” To the contrary, as shown above, 12 U.S.C. 25b(b)(5)(A) makes clear that the
OCC’s interpretation is entitled only to Skidmore deference. The OCC’s interpretation does not
merit Skidmore deference because it lacks any statutory basis. In addition, as shown below, the
OCC’s interpretation seeks to preempt – without congressional authorization – state “true lender”
laws that determine whether a national bank has “made” a loan and therefore qualifies for the
preemption provided by 12 U.S.C. 85.
10

For additional reasons why the OCC has no authority to extend the scope of preemption of state usury laws under
12 U.S.C. 85 and 1463(g) to reach nonbanks that are purchasers or assignees of loans made by national banks and
federal savings associations, see Wilmarth Comment Letter, supra note 6, at 7-10.
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As the OCC recognizes, “partnerships” between national banks and third-party nonbank
lenders are governed by contracts. 85 Fed. Reg. at 44224. The OCC fails to acknowledge,
however, that contracts made by national banks are governed by applicable state laws unless a
particular state law creates an irreconcilable conflict with a federal statute. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that national banks “are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in
their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their
contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of property,
their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State
law.” Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting National Bank
v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1870)). In Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 559
U.S. at 534, the Supreme Court affirmed that “States . . . have always enforced their general laws
against national banks – and have enforced their banking-related laws against national banks for
at least 85 years.” See also Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 944-48 (discussing additional Supreme
Court decisions that have upheld the application of state laws to contracts and other transactions
made by national banks).
Contracts for loans are subject to state usury laws as well as general state contract laws.
State usury laws are valid exercises of the states’ historic police power to protect their residents
from predatory and abusive lending practices. See Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563, 569
(1910) (It is “elementary” that usury laws fall “within the police power” of the states.); Goleta
National Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 716 (“[T]he State does have a vital interest in
protecting its citizens from predatory lending, usury, and other forms of deceptive trade
practices.”); Pa. Dept. of Banking v. NCAS of Delaware, LLC, 948 A.2d 752, 759 (Pa. 2008)
(“[R]egulation of the rate of interest is a subject within the police power of the State, and this is
especially true in the case of loans of comparatively small amounts, since the business of making
such loans profoundly affects the social life of the community.”) (quoting Equitable Credit &
Discount Co. v. Geier, 21 A.2d 53, 58 (Pa. 1941)); James M. Ackerman, “Interest Rates and the
Law: A History of Usury,” 1981 Arizona State Law Journal 61, 85-110 (explaining that state
usury laws “are viewed as a protective measure imposed to safeguard consumers from abuse and
exploitation by sellers of credit,” id. at 110).
Because usury is a traditional field of state regulation, federal courts have declined to
infer from statutory silence that Congress intended to preempt state usury laws. See Doyle v.
Southern Guaranty Corp., 795 F.2d 907, 914 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting Congress’s “traditional
deference to the state’s right to determine its usury statute”); Goleta National Bank v. Lingerfelt,
211 F. Supp. 2d at 716-18 (rejecting the claim that the NBA completely preempted the
application of state usury laws to a “non-national bank,” which made loans as an alleged partner
of a national bank, because that preemption claim was “far from being facially conclusive or
readily apparent”); see also In re Seolas, 140 B.R. 266, 272 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (“ERISA does not
preempt generally applicable usury laws [in the] absence of any evidence that Congress intended
preemption,” because “usury laws are a traditional subject of state regulation.”). As noted
above, the OCC has acknowledged that Congress has not expressed any intention to override
“true lender” laws that are a key component of many state usury laws.11
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See the first paragraph of this Part 2(b).
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Under 12 U.S.C. 85, the NBA incorporates all of the usury laws of the state where a
national bank is located. Section 85 provides that a national bank may “charge” interest “at the
rate allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank is located . . . and no more” (emphasis
added). Courts have confirmed that Section 85 incorporates the entire usury jurisprudence of the
state where a national bank is located, including the state’s usury statutes and judicial
interpretations of those statutes. “True lender” laws are part of the usury jurisprudence of many
states, as shown below.
In 1896, the Supreme Court held that a national bank “cannot enforce a contract
forbidden by the terms of [usury] statutes” in the state where the bank is located. Union National
Bank v. Louisville, N., A. & C. Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 325, 330 (1896) (applying Illinois law). The
Court explained that Section 85 incorporates the usury statutes of that state as interpreted by the
courts of that state:
[T]he true construction of state [usury] legislation is a matter of state
jurisprudence; and, while the right of the national bank springs from the act of
congress, yet it is only a right to have an equal administration of the rule
established by the state law. It does not involve a reservation to the national
courts of the authority to determine adversely to the state courts what is the rule
as to interest prescribed by the state law, but only to see that such rule is equally
enforced in favor of national banks. The decision here was not against any
equality of right, but only a determination of the meaning of the state law as
applied to all creditors. The decision [of the Illinois Supreme Court] was not
against any equality of right, but only a determination of the meaning of the state
law as applied to all creditors. It therefore denied no rights given by the federal
statute.
Id. at 331 (emphasis added). Accord, Citizens National Bank v. Donnell, 195 U.S. 369, 374
(1904) (“[W]e follow the state court” in determining whether a national bank violated Missouri’s
usury laws); Daggs v. Phoenix National Bank, 177 U.S. 549, 555 (1900) (“The intention of the
[NBA] is to adopt the state law, and permit to national banks what the state law allows to its
citizens and to the banks organized by it.”).
Subsequent decisions have confirmed that Section 85 incorporates the entire corpus of
state usury jurisprudence embodied in the statutes and court decisions of the state where a
national bank is located. Bartholomew v. Northampton National Bank, 584 F.2d 1288, 1295 (3d
Cir. 1978) (The NBA “incorporates by reference the usury law of the state where the national
bank is located.”); First National Bank of Mena v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1975)
(Section 85 “adopts the entire case law of the state interpreting the state’s limitations on usury; it
does not merely incorporate the numerical rate adopted by the state.”); Roper v. Consurve, Inc.,
777 F. Supp. 508, 513 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (Section 85 “adopts not only the numerical interest rates
set by state statute, but also the entire case law of the state interpreting the state’s limitations on
usury.”), aff’d, 932 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.) (table), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 861 (1991).
Federal and state courts have also held that claims of usury should be determined based
on the “substance” of the relevant transactions and not their legal “form.” In Scott v. Lloyd, 34
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U.S. 418 (1835), Chief Justice John Marshall observed, “The ingenuity of lenders has devised
many contrivances, by which, under forms sanctioned by law, the [usury] statute may be evaded.
. . . Courts, therefore, perceived the necessity of disregarding the form, and examining into the
real nature of the transaction.” Id. at 446-47. Quoting Lord Mansfield, Marshall explained that
an alleged violation of usury laws should be evaluated based on “the substance of the transaction
and the true intent and meaning of the parties, for they alone are to govern, and not the words
used.” Id. at 453 (emphasis added). Marshall also quoted Lord Mansfield’s statement that “the
only question in all cases like the present, is, what is the real substance of the transaction, not
what is the colour and form.” Id. at 456 (emphasis added). Marshall concluded, “If the real
contract was for a loan of money, . . . it is plainly within the statute of usury; and this fact was
very properly left to the jury.” Id. at 459.
Thus, Scott v. Lloyd embraced a case-by-case, substance-over-form approach for
determining whether a transaction is usurious. That approach has been adopted by “true lender”
laws in many states, as described below. The OCC’s proposed rule is contrary to Scott v. Lloyd
and state “true lender” laws because it would establish a conclusive, inflexible, and formalistic
standard for determining the identity of the “true lender” of a loan generated by a “partnership”
between a national bank and a nonbank. The OCC’s proposed rule would consider only two
narrow factors – whether the national bank was named as the lender in the loan agreement or
whether the national bank funded the loan for at least one day.
Numerous federal and state courts have evaluated usury claims against national banks by
“look[ing] behind the form of a transaction to its substance,” as required by the usury laws of the
states where the banks were located. Anderson v. Hershey, 142 F.2d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1942)
(applying Kentucky law); accord, First National Bank in Mena v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d at 877
(applying Arkansas law); Ubaldi v. SLM Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194-98 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(applying California law); First National Bank v. Phares, 174 P. 519, 521 (Okla. 1918) (applying
Oklahoma law); see also CashCall, Inc. v. Morrissey, 2014 WL 2404300, at *14 –*15 & n.19,
*18 (W.Va. May 30, 2014) (applying West Virginia law in “examining the substance, and not
just the form,” of agreements between a nonbank lender and an FDIC-insured state bank to
determine which entity was the “true lender”); CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., 2016 WL 4820635 at *5
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (applying the laws of 16 states, and concluding that the court “should
look to the substance, not the form, of the transaction to identify the true lender” in a joint
venture between a nonbank lender and a “tribal lending entity”).
Federal and state courts have applied a case-by-case, substance-over-form analysis, in
accordance with state usury laws, to determine whether nonbank lenders were the “true lenders”
in allegedly usurious transactions. Courts have rejected claims that nonbank lenders were
entitled to preemptive immunity under 12 U.S.C. 85 or 1831d simply because they acted as
“partners” or “agents” of national banks or FDIC-insured state banks. In determining whether
nonbank lenders were the “true lenders,” courts have considered several factors, including which
party held the “predominant economic interest” in the loan, which party bore the greatest amount
of credit risk under the loan, which party controlled the terms and enforcement of the loan, and
whether the nonbank lender indemnified the national bank. In re Community Bank of N. Va., 418
F.3d at 283-85, 294-97 (applying Pennsylvania law); Ubaldi, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 1194-1200
(applying California law); Eul v. Transworld Systems, 2017 WL 1178537 at *5 –*10 (N.D. Ill.
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Mar. 30, 2017) (applying Illinois law); Goleta National Bank v. O’Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 2d 745,
753-58 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (applying Ohio law); Goleta National Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp.
2d at 717-19 (applying North Carolina law); CashCall, Inc. v. Morrissey, 2014 WL 2404300 at
*6 –*8, *14 –*15, *18 (applying West Virginia law in determining that the nonbank lender was
the “true lender” instead of its partner, an FDIC-insured state bank); see also CFPB v. CashCall,
Inc., 2016 WL 4820635 at *5 –*7 (applying the laws of 16 states in which the affected borrowers
resided, and determining that the nonbank lender was the “true lender” rather than its partner, a
“tribal lending entity”).
As explained above, the OCC’s proposed rule attempts to override state “true lender”
laws. It would allow a nonbank lender to claim preemptive immunity from a wide range of state
laws even if (1) its “partner” national bank held loans in its name or funded loans for only one
day, (2) the nonbank lender assumed all of the credit risk for the loans after that day, (3) the
nonbank lender controlled the terms and enforcement of the loans, and (4) the nonbank lender
indemnified the national bank against risks and losses connected to the loans. The proposed rule
would severely impair the ability of states to enforce their usury laws – and, potentially, many
other state consumer protection laws – against nonbank lenders that enter into “partnerships”
with national banks or federal savings associations.
When a party alleges that a federal statute preempts an area of traditional state regulation
– such as usury – the courts “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)); accord, Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1191. As shown above, Congress has
clearly demarcated the limits of federal usury preemption under 12 U.S.C. 85 and 1463(g). Both
statutes expressly provide that loans are not entitled to such preemption unless they are “made”
by national banks or federal savings associations. In addition, as shown above, the Supreme
Court and other courts have held that Section 85 incorporates the entire usury jurisprudence of
the state where a national bank is located, including state “true lender” laws. If there were any
doubt about the matter, the Supreme Court has explained that, in determining the preemptive
scope of “a federal statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed” – like the NBA and
HOLA – “matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left subject to the
disposition provided by state law.” O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1993).
In contrast, when Congress wanted to allow purchasers and assignees of residential
mortgage loans to inherit the preemptive immunity from state usury laws that the original lenders
enjoyed, Congress made that intention abundantly clear.12 The NBA and HOLA are devoid of
any indication that Congress intended to authorize national banks and federal savings
associations to transfer their preemptive immunity from state usury laws to nonbank purchasers
or assignees of non-mortgage loans. Hence, there is no evidence of any “clear and manifest
See 12 U.S.C. 3803, which (i) expressly allows nonbank “housing creditors” to “purchase and enforce alternative
mortgage transactions” that are originated by other lenders in accordance with the Alternative Mortgage
Transactions Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. 3801-06, and (ii) expressly preempts conflicting state laws. See also Senate
Report No. 96-368, at 19 (1979) (stating that “loans originated under [the] usury exemption” contained in 12 U.S.C.
1735f-7a “will not be subject to claims of usury [under state law] even if they are later sold to an investor who is not
exempt under this section”); see also Wilmarth Comment Letter, supra note 6, at 8-9.
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purpose of Congress” that would authorize the OCC to adopt the proposed rule and override state
“true lender” laws.
Consumer protection is another traditional area of state regulation. Courts have
repeatedly held that federal statutes do not preempt state consumer protection laws unless there is
“compelling evidence” of a congressional intent to preempt the state laws in question. As the
Ninth Circuit explained in Lusnak, “Where, as here, we are confronted with state consumer
protection laws, ‘a field traditionally regulated by the states, compelling evidence of an intention
to preempt is required.’” 883 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 917 (9th
Cir. 2011) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Abrams, 897 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1990)).
As shown above in Part 1, the Dodd-Frank Act makes clear that Congress does not intend
to preempt state consumer financial laws unless they create an irreconcilable conflict with a
federal statute. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act requires nonbanks to comply with applicable
state laws, even if they have contractual or structural relationships with national banks. See 12
U.S.C. 25b(b)(1) & (2), (c), (e), (h) & (i); see also 12 U.S.C. 5551-52. Thus, there is no
evidence of an irreconcilable conflict between state “true lender” laws and any federal statute.
Accordingly, the proposed rule’s attempt to override state “true lender” laws is unlawful and
invalid.
3.

The Proposed Rule Is Contrary to the Public Interest Because It Would
Promote “Rent-a-Charter” Schemes and Allow Nonbank Lenders to Exploit
Consumers and Small Businesses.

The OCC’s proposed rule is contrary to the public interest because it would allow
national banks and federal savings associations to enter into “rent-a-charter” schemes with
nonbank lenders. “Rent-a-charter” schemes (1) support efforts by nonbank lenders to engage in
predatory lending and other abusive practices that inflict severe injuries on consumers and small
businesses, and (2) severely impair the states’ authority to protect their residents from
exploitation by nonbank lenders. The OCC recognized the unacceptable risks created by “rent-acharter” schemes in the early 2000s, when the OCC established a policy banning national banks
from entering into such arrangements with nonbank lenders. The OCC’s ban on “rent-a-charter”
schemes has remained in place until now.
“Rent-a-charter” schemes are created by joint ventures between national banks or other
FDIC-insured institutions and nonbank lenders. The typical “rent-a-charter” scheme provides
that the bank is the nominal originator or funder of high-cost loans that are made to consumers or
small businesses. However, the nonbank lender usually markets, reviews, and approves those
loans before they are originated or funded by the bank. The nonbank lender purchases the loans
from the bank shortly after origination and thereafter services and enforces the loans. The
nonbank lender also frequently indemnifies the bank against risks and losses connected to the
loans.
High-cost nonbank lenders form “rent-a-charter” partnerships with banks that are located
in states with few if any usury limits. Nonbank lenders assert that they can evade restrictive state
usury laws by relying on their partner banks’ authority to charge higher interest rates under
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federal law. See, e.g., In re Community Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d at 283-85, 294-97 (describing
alleged “rent-a-charter” arrangements between a predatory nonbank lender and a national bank
and an FDIC-insured state bank); Ubaldi, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 1194-96, 1200-01 (describing a
similar scheme in which a national bank allegedly “rent[ed] out its bank charter” to a high-cost
nonbank lender); Eul, 2017 WL 1178537 at *5 –*7 (examining an alleged “rent-a-charter”
arrangement between a high-cost nonbank lender and a national bank); CashCall, Inc. v.
Morrissey, 2014 WL 2404300 at *1 –*2, *6 –*8, *14 –*15 (describing a “rent-a-charter” scheme
between a high-cost nonbank lender and an FDIC-insured state bank).13
“Rent-a-charter” schemes are designed to prevent states from enforcing their usury laws
and other consumer protection laws against high-cost nonbank lenders. The OCC’s notice of
proposed rulemaking asserts that the proposed rule would permit lending “partnerships” that
create “benefits, including expanding access to affordable credit.” 85 Fed. Reg. at 44226. In
fact, the loans generated by rent-a-charter schemes are not “affordable.” Nonbank lenders that
participate in those schemes – including payday lenders and auto title lenders – impose very high
interest charges with annual percentage rates (“APRs”) that often exceed 100%. Loans made by
high-cost nonbank lenders produce staggering rates of delinquency and default among
borrowers. For example, Elevate, a high-cost lender that is a “partner” of several banks, reported
charge-off rates on its loans that exceeded 52% of its revenues in 2016 and 2017. Similarly,
more than one-fifth of borrowers who enter into auto title loans eventually lose their cars through
repossession. Nonbank lenders usually focus their marketing efforts on communities with high
percentages of vulnerable, lower-income households.14
The OCC is well aware of the unconscionable interest rates that nonbank lenders charge
in “rent-a-charter” schemes. In July 2019, the OCC and the FDIC filed a joint amicus brief in
support of World Business Lenders (WBL), a high-cost nonbank lender that entered into a “renta-charter” arrangement with Bank of Lake Mills, an FDIC-insured state bank located in
Wisconsin. The OCC and FDIC supported WBL’s attempt to enforce a loan with an APR of
120% against a small business located in Colorado. WBL invoked its partner bank’s right to
make loans with APRs of 120% under Wisconsin law, even though Colorado’s usury laws
imposed a maximum permissible APR of 45%. WBL is involved in other litigation, in which it
seeks to enforce small business loans with APRs ranging from 72% to 138%, based on its claims
of preemptive immunity under “rent-a-charter” schemes with various banks. Evidently, the
FDIC and OCC are not concerned about the “affordability” of WBL’s loans.15
See also Jayne Munger, “Note: Crossing State Lines: The Trojan Horse Invasion of Rent-a-Bank and Rent-a-Tribe
Schemes in Modern Usury Law,” 87 George Washington Law Review 468, 475-77 (2019).
14
Testimony of Graciela Aponte-Diaz, Center for Responsible Lending, before the House Financial Services
Committee (Feb. 5, 2020), at 3-8, available at
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/graciela_testimony_crl_rent_a_bank_final_rev.pdf; Testimony of
Lauren Saunders, National Consumer Law Center, before the House Financial Services Committee (Feb. 5, 2020), at
7-13, available at
https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/lauren_saunders_testimony_on_rent_a_bank_hearing_revised_2-520.pdf. See also CashCall, Inc. v. Morrissey, 2014 WL 2404300, at *1 –*8 (stating that more than two-thirds of
West Virginia borrowers who received high-cost loans from CashCall defaulted on those loans, and describing the
predatory lending and abusive debt collection practices that CashCall perpetrated against those borrowers in
violation of West Virginia laws).
15
Saunders Testimony, supra note 14, at 10-13.
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The OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking states that a national bank’s “overall returns”
on loans made through “lending relationships with third parties” would be deemed “reasonably
related to the bank’s risks and costs of the loans” if the returns on 12-month loans “do not
exceed, the principal amount of the loan[s].” 85 Fed. Reg. at 44227. That statement indicates
that the OCC would allow national banks and their nonbank “partners” to make loans with APRs
of up to 100%. Loans with such astronomical APRs would stretch the concept of “affordability”
beyond any reasonable definition of that term. One wonders whether any senior OCC officials
would be willing to borrow money at those sky-high rates.
In the early 2000s, the OCC recognized the dangers created by high-cost, short-term
consumer loans, “commonly referred to as ‘payday loans,’”16 which were marketed to consumers
through “rent-a-charter” schemes established by national banks and nonbank lenders. The OCC
took decisive action to shut down those schemes. The OCC issued enforcement orders that
required four national banks – Eagle National Bank, First National Bank of Brookings, Goleta
National Bank, and Peoples National Bank of Paris, Texas – to stop making payday loans and to
terminate their “rent-a-charter” partnerships with nonbank lenders.
In announcing the OCC’s enforcement order against Eagle National Bank in January
2002, Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. said that Eagle “essentially rented out its
national bank charter to a payday lender.” The OCC determined that Eagle “risked its financial
viability” and conducted its “payday lending program . . . in violation of a multitude of standards
of safe and sound banking, compliance requirements, and OCC guidance.” Comptroller Hawke
declared that Eagle’s conduct
demonstrates the dangers inherent in arrangements under which national banks
rent out their charters to nonbank providers of financial services . . . . Not only did
Eagle allow itself to become a mere appendage to Dollar, but it effectively
collaborated in Dollar's scheme to evade state law requirements that would
otherwise be applicable to it.17
In announcing the OCC’s enforcement order against Peoples National Bank in January
2003, Comptroller Hawke similarly stated:
We have been greatly concerned with arrangements in which national banks
essentially rent out their charters to third parties who want to evade state and local
consumer protection laws . . . . The preemption privileges of national banks derive
from the Constitution and are not a commodity that can be transferred for a fee to
nonbank lenders.18
16

OCC Consent Order 2003-2, at 1-2 (Jan. 30, 2003) (Peoples National Bank), available at
https://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2003-2.pdf.
17
OCC News Release 2002-1 (Jan. 3, 2002) (Eagle National Bank), available at https://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2002/nr-occ-2002-1.html.
18
OCC News Release 2003-6 (Jan. 31, 2003) (Peoples National Bank), available at https://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2003/nr-occ-2003-6.html. See also OCC News Release 2003-3 (Jan. 31, 2003) (First
National Bank of Brookings), available at https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2003/nr-occ-20033.html; OCC Consent Order 2002-93 (Oct. 28, 2002) (Goleta National Bank), available at
https://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2002-93.pdf.
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Comptroller Hawke also explained that, “[i]n many of these cases, we have also found that the
bank failed to properly manage its relationships with the payday lenders, leading to significant
safety and soundness problems and violations of federal laws and regulations.” The OCC’s order
against Peoples National Bank pointed out that “no payday lenders are any longer carrying on
business through a relationship with a national bank.”19
In a speech delivered in February 2002, Comptroller Hawke described the OCC’s reasons
for shutting down “rent-a-charter” schemes between national banks and nonbank lenders. He
explained that “nonbank lenders who would otherwise have been fully subject to various state
regulatory laws have sought to rent out the preemption privileges of a national bank to evade
such laws.” He condemned such schemes as illegitimate because
[t]he benefit that national banks enjoy by reason of this important constitutional
doctrine [of preemption] cannot be treated as a piece of disposable property that a
bank may rent out to a third party that is not a national bank. Preemption is not
like excess space in a bank-owned office building. It is an inalienable right of the
bank itself.
Comptroller Hawke described a typical “rent-a-charter” scheme in which the payday
lender “attempts to clothe itself with the status of an ‘agent’ of the national bank” while retaining
the “predominant economic interest” in the resulting loans. He denounced such arrangements as
“an abuse of the national charter.” He warned that “rent-a-charter” schemes were “highly
conducive to the creation of safety and soundness problems at the bank, which may not have the
capacity to manage effectively a multistate loan origination operation that is in reality the
business of the payday lender.”20
The OCC’s current website provides the following description of its enforcement actions
in the early 2000s to prohibit national banks from entering into “rent-a-charter” schemes with
nonbank payday lenders:
Payday lending can provide short-term access to credit, but it often comes with
high rates of interest and expensive fees.
A handful of national banks essentially rented out their charters to third party
payday lenders. The OCC found a number of abuses in these relationships. Of
primary concern was the inability of small banks to properly oversee the third
parties who were making loans in their names. Among the abuses: deceptive
marketing practices, failure to secure confidential customer files, and unsafe and
unsound lending. The OCC took a series of enforcement actions that eliminated
these relationships from the national banking system.21
19

OCC News Release 2003-6, supra note 18.
Remarks by Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. before the Women in Housing and Finance (Feb. 12,
2002), at 10, available at https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2002/pub-speech-2002-10.pdf.
21
OCC webpage, “Consumers and Communities: Consumer Protection – Payday Lending,” available at
https://www.occ.gov/topics/consumers-and-communities/consumer-protection/payday-lending/index-payday20
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Thus, the OCC established a strong policy in the early 2000s that prohibited national
banks from participating in “rent-a-charter” schemes with nonbank lenders. As shown by the
OCC’s current website, that policy has remained in effect until now. The OCC’s enforcement
orders in the early 2000s, Comptroller Hawke’s speech in 2002, and the OCC’s current website
provide compelling evidence of the significant harms that would be caused by the proposed rule
in combination with the Madden-fix rule. Those harms include: undermining the states’
longstanding authority to protect their residents from predatory nonbank lenders, threatening the
financial and reputational viability of national banks, encouraging unsafe and unsound lending
practices, and promoting efforts by nonbanks to injure consumers and small businesses through
deceptive marketing practices, privacy violations, and other abuses.
Accordingly, there is a “clear and present danger” that the proposed rule and the Maddenfix rule “will lead to an explosion of harmful predatory lending and the evisceration of states’
historic ability to protect their residents.”22 That dual outcome – enabling predatory lending and
impairing the states’ authority to protect their residents – would undermine core purposes of the
Dodd-Frank Act.
When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, it strongly criticized federal financial
regulators for failing to take timely and effective actions to stop predatory nonprime mortgage
lending during the 1990s and 2000s, even after regulators received many warnings about the
dangers of nonprime mortgages. As the Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank explained:
Underlying the whole chain of events leading to the financial crisis was the
spectacular failure of the prudential regulators to protect average American
homeowners from risky, unaffordable, ‘exploding’ adjustable-rate mortgages,
interest only mortgages, and negative amortization mortgages. These regulators
‘routinely sacrificed consumer protection for short-term profitability of banks,’
undercapitalized mortgage firms and mortgage brokers, and Wall Street
investment firms, despite the fact that so many people were raising the alarm
about the problems these loans would cause.23
Congress specifically condemned the OCC and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)
for aggressively preempting efforts by many states to stop predatory lending during the 1990s
and 2000s. Senate Report No. 111-176, at 16-17. The Senate committee report concluded:
In sum, the Federal Reserve and other federal regulators failed to use their
authority to deal with mortgage and other consumer abuses in a timely way, and
lending.html (visited on Aug. 10, 2020). The OCC’s “Payday Lending” webpage includes weblinks to the OCC’s
enforcement orders against Peoples National Bank and First National Bank of Brookings.
22
National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), “FDIC/OCC Proposal Would Encourage Rent-a-Bank Predatory
Lending” (Dec. 2019), at 9, available at https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/ib-fdic-rent-abank-proposal-dec2019.pdf.
23
Senate Report No. 111-176, at 15 (2010) (quoting testimony of Prof. Patricia McCoy on Mar. 3, 2009). For
further analysis of the pervasive failures by federal financial regulators to stop predatory nonprime lending, see
Kathleen Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps
157-226 (Oxford University Press, 2011); Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 897-908.

19

the OCC and the OTS actively created an environment where abusive mortgage
lending could flourish without State controls.24
In adopting the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress expressed great concerns about payday
lending and other abusive financial practices that the proposed rule and the Madden-fix rule
would encourage. Senate Report No. 111-176, at 19-21 (2010). As shown above, the proposed
rule and the Madden-fix rule would allow nonbank lenders to exploit consumers and small
businesses by using “rent-a-charter” schemes to make toxic high-cost loans (including payday
loans) and evade state usury laws and other state consumer protection laws. See also NCLC,
supra note 22, at 2-6, 8-9.
The OTS’s and OCC’s regulatory failures and their unwarranted preemption of state laws
during the 1990s and 2000s were major factors behind Congress’s decisions to abolish the OTS
and impose significant constraints on the OCC’s authority to preempt state consumer financial
laws. See Senate Report No. 111-176, at 16-17, 25-26, 175-77 (2010). In view of that recent
history, the OCC has no legal basis for its attempt to launch a new preemption campaign that
would undermine the states’ historic authority to protect their residents against predatory
nonbank lenders.
4.

The Proposed Rule Violates the Administrative Procedure Act Because It
Does Not Provide Notice of, and “Good Reasons” for, the OCC’s Reversal of
Its Policy Banning “Rent-a-Charter” Schemes.

As shown in Part 3, the OCC established a strong policy in the early 2000s of barring
national banks from entering into “rent-a-charter” schemes with high-cost nonbank lenders. The
OCC has maintained that policy until now, as shown by its current website.
The OCC’s existing policy was based on a number of important factors, which were
described in its enforcement orders, Comptroller Hawke’s 2002 speech, and the OCC’s current
website. Until now, the OCC has banned “rent-a-charter” schemes because it determined that
those schemes (1) unlawfully impair the states’ longstanding authority to enforce their usury
laws and other consumer protection laws against nonbank lenders, (2) compromise the ability of
national banks to maintain adequate controls over their lending activities, (3) encourage unsafe
and unsound lending, (4) threaten the financial and reputational viability of national banks, and
(5) harm consumers by promoting predatory lending, deceptive marketing practices. privacy
violations, and other abuses.
The OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking does not explain why the agency has decided
to reverse its policy prohibiting national banks from entering into “rent-a-charter” schemes with
nonbank lenders. The notice of proposed rulemaking does not provide the factual, legal, and

24

Senate Report No. 111-176, at 17 (2010). For additional discussions of the injuries caused to consumers and the
U.S. economy by the OCC’s and OTS’s sweeping preemption of state consumer protection laws and their
interference with state enforcement efforts during the 1990s and 2000s, see Elosta, supra note 5, at 1278-81, 128486; Engel & McCoy, supra note 23, at 157-86; Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 909-19; Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 22837, 306-16, 348-56.
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policy basis for the OCC’s decision to reverse its policy. In fact, the notice does not inform the
public that the agency has changed its policy.
In view of the glaring omissions described above, the OCC’s proposed rule is unlawful
and invalid under the public notice requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5
U.S.C. 553(b)(3). The OCC’s proposed rule violates Section 553(b)(3) because it does not give
the public adequate notice of, and a reasonable opportunity to submit informed comments on, the
OCC’s decision to reverse its policy and its factual, legal, and policy reasons for doing so.25
If adopted, the OCC’s proposed rule would be “arbitrary and capricious,” and therefore
unlawful, under a separate provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). As shown above, the
proposed rule would reverse the policy established by the OCC in the early 2000s, when it
prohibited national banks from participating in “rent-a-charter” schemes with nonbank lenders.
The proposed rule would reverse the OCC’s existing policy without recognizing that policy
reversal. As the Supreme Court has made clear, “An agency may not . . . depart from a prior
policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.” FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
In addition, the OCC’s proposed rule does not provide “good reasons” for the OCC’s
decision to reverse its policy, including “a reasoned explanation . . . for disregarding facts and
circumstances that underlay . . . the prior policy.” Id. at 515-16; see also Encino Motorcars, LLC
v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-27 (2016) (holding that a regulation issued by the Department
of Labor was “arbitrary and capricious” because it was “issued without the reasoned explanation
that was required in light of the Department’s change in position and the significant reliance
interests involved”). The OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking does not explain whether (and,
if so, why) the agency now disagrees with the factual findings and policy concerns that the
agency identified when it barred national banks from participating in “rent-a-bank” schemes with
nonbank lenders in the early 2000s. The notice also fails to provide other “good reasons” for
reversing the OCC’s existing policy.
Accordingly, the OCC would violate the APA if it adopted the proposed rule, unless the
OCC first completes the following steps: (A) the OCC must evaluate the factual findings and
public policy concerns that the OCC identified in the early 2000s, when it established its existing
policy prohibiting national banks from participating in “rent-a-charter” schemes with nonbank
lenders; (B) the OCC must provide “good reasons” for reversing its existing policy, including a
“reasoned explanation” why the OCC now disagrees with the factual findings and public policy
concerns that caused the OCC to adopt that policy; (C) the OCC must provide public notice of its
intention to reverse its existing policy and its “good reasons” for doing so, and (D) the OCC must
The APA’s public notice requirement, 12 U.S.C. 553(b)(3), ensures that (1) an agency’s proposed rule will
receive adequate scrutiny from a diversity of public views, and (2) affected parties will be given a fair opportunity to
present their objections to the proposed rule. Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. EPA, 737 F.3d 95, 100 (D.C.
Cir. 2013). The “adequacy” of an agency’s notice of proposed rulemaking “must be tested by determining whether
it would fairly apprise interested persons of the ‘subjects and issues’ before the agency.” Prometheus Radio Project
v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 411 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d
Cir. 1977)). “A notice of proposed rulemaking is legally inadequate if it does not ‘adequately frame the subjects for
discussion.’” Citibank Federal Savings Bank v. FDIC, 836 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 1993) (quoting Connecticut Power
& Light Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
25
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give the public a reasonable opportunity to submit comments on its proposal to reverse its policy
and its stated reasons for doing so.
*******************************************************
For all of the reasons stated above, the OCC should withdraw the proposed rule, and the
OCC should not issue any other rule or order that would (1) override state “true lender” laws or
(2) allow national banks to participate in “rent-a-bank” schemes with nonbank lenders.
Thank you for your consideration of the foregoing comments.26
Very truly yours,

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
Professor Emeritus of Law
George Washington University Law School
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This comment letter is submitted in my personal capacity and does not represent the views of The George
Washington University or its Law School.
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